ZTE Communications ›› 2021, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (4): 79-89.DOI: 10.12142/ZTECOM.202104009
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YAN Xincheng1,2(), TENG Huiyun2, PING Li2, JIANG Zhihong2, ZHOU Na1,2
Online:
2021-12-25
Published:
2022-01-04
About author:
YAN Xincheng (YAN Xincheng, TENG Huiyun, PING Li, JIANG Zhihong, ZHOU Na. Study on Security of 5G and Satellite Converged Communication Network[J]. ZTE Communications, 2021, 19(4): 79-89.
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URL: http://zte.magtechjournal.com/EN/10.12142/ZTECOM.202104009
Network Layer | Security Attributes | Categories of Security Technology | Sub-Categories of Security Technology |
---|---|---|---|
Network application layer | Communication security | Data communication security | User data communication security |
Network function layer | Authenticity | Identity authenticity | Terminal access authentication |
Authentication between network nodes | |||
Availability | Network availability | Anti-DDoS attack | |
Anti-UE random access attack | |||
Communication security | Network resource sharing | RAN slice isolation | |
Core network slice isolation | |||
Data communication security | Network function communication security | ||
Network transmission layer | Communication security | Network resource sharing | Bearer network slice isolation |
Data communication security | Bearer network communication security | ||
Availability | Network availability | Anti-DDoS attack | |
Authenticity | Identity authenticity | Authentication between network nodes | |
Infrastructure layer | Availability | Network availability | Anti-wireless communication interference |
Authenticity | Identity authenticity | Trusted boot of satellite nodes |
Table 1 Catalogue of security protection technology
Network Layer | Security Attributes | Categories of Security Technology | Sub-Categories of Security Technology |
---|---|---|---|
Network application layer | Communication security | Data communication security | User data communication security |
Network function layer | Authenticity | Identity authenticity | Terminal access authentication |
Authentication between network nodes | |||
Availability | Network availability | Anti-DDoS attack | |
Anti-UE random access attack | |||
Communication security | Network resource sharing | RAN slice isolation | |
Core network slice isolation | |||
Data communication security | Network function communication security | ||
Network transmission layer | Communication security | Network resource sharing | Bearer network slice isolation |
Data communication security | Bearer network communication security | ||
Availability | Network availability | Anti-DDoS attack | |
Authenticity | Identity authenticity | Authentication between network nodes | |
Infrastructure layer | Availability | Network availability | Anti-wireless communication interference |
Authenticity | Identity authenticity | Trusted boot of satellite nodes |
Solution | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|
Solution 1 | 1) End-to-end encryption 2) The intermediate network cannot obtain data and the level of privacy and security are high | 1) The legal interception function is affected 2) VoLTE service quality is affected |
Solution 2 | 1) Segmented encryption easy for security supervision 2) IMS service is not affected | It is possible for the network provider to obtain confidential user data |
Table 2 Comparison of on-board security solutions without user plane encryption
Solution | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|
Solution 1 | 1) End-to-end encryption 2) The intermediate network cannot obtain data and the level of privacy and security are high | 1) The legal interception function is affected 2) VoLTE service quality is affected |
Solution 2 | 1) Segmented encryption easy for security supervision 2) IMS service is not affected | It is possible for the network provider to obtain confidential user data |
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