ZTE Communications ›› 2025, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (3): 59-70.DOI: 10.12142/ZTECOM.202503007
-
收稿日期:2024-01-26出版日期:2025-09-25发布日期:2025-09-11
Analysis of Feasible Solutions for Railway 5G Network Security Assessment
XU Hang1(
), SUN Bin1, DING Jianwen1, WANG Wei2
- 1.Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China
2.ZTE Corporation, Shenzhen 518057, China
-
Received:2024-01-26Online:2025-09-25Published:2025-09-11 -
About author:XU Hang (22125067@bjtu.edu.cn) received his BE degree in communication engineering from China University of Petroleum in 2022. He is currently working toward a master's degree at the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety, Beijing Jiaotong University, China. His research interests include network security and 5G-R.
SUN Bin received his BS and MS degrees in electronic engineering from Beijing Jiaotong University, China in 2004 and 2007, respectively. From 2007 to 2015, he served as an R&D manager with Beijing Liujie Technology Co., Ltd. He is currently an assistant researcher with the School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University. His main research interest is the interconnection and interworking of the core network for dedicated railway mobile communication systems.
DING Jianwen received his BS and MS degrees from Beijing Jiaotong University, China in 2002 and 2005, respectively. He is currently a professor of engineering with the School of Electronic and Information Engineering, Beijing Jiaotong University. He received the second prize for progress in science and technology from the Chinese Railway Society. His research interests include broadband mobile communications and personal communications, dedicated mobile communication systems for railway, and safety communication technology for train control systems.
WANG Wei is the LTE-R technical director and a railway wireless communication system expert at ZTE Corporation, with rich experience in the GSM-R system design. He has a deep understanding of GSM-R and LTE-R and has undertaken several major railway-related projects on wireless communication systems. -
Supported by:the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(2025JBXT010);NSFC(62171021);the Project of China State Railway Group(N2024B004);ZTE Industry?University?Institute Cooperation Funds(l23L00010)
引用本文
. [J]. ZTE Communications, 2025, 23(3): 59-70.
XU Hang, SUN Bin, DING Jianwen, WANG Wei. Analysis of Feasible Solutions for Railway 5G Network Security Assessment[J]. ZTE Communications, 2025, 23(3): 59-70.
| Aspect | 5G‑R Network | Railway 5G PNI‑NPN |
|---|---|---|
Construction department | Railway Department | Operators |
Carried services | Critical services such as operational safety, running, and service tasks | Non-critical services like passenger communication services and general data transmission |
Network frequency band | Independent frequency band for railways | Shared operator frequency bands |
Network architecture | Closed, independent network architecture specific to railways | Public 5G network architecture |
Performance requirements | High reliability, low latency, high speed, and high security | General performance requirements |
Table 1 Differences between 5G-R network and railway 5G PNI-NPN
| Aspect | 5G‑R Network | Railway 5G PNI‑NPN |
|---|---|---|
Construction department | Railway Department | Operators |
Carried services | Critical services such as operational safety, running, and service tasks | Non-critical services like passenger communication services and general data transmission |
Network frequency band | Independent frequency band for railways | Shared operator frequency bands |
Network architecture | Closed, independent network architecture specific to railways | Public 5G network architecture |
Performance requirements | High reliability, low latency, high speed, and high security | General performance requirements |
Figure 1 Security architecture for the Fifth Generation of Mobile Communications for Railways (5G-R) network
| Security Aspects | 5G‑R Network | Railway 5G PNI‑NPN |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy protection | Industry-tailored privacy protection | Customer data privacy enforcement |
| Network isolation | Granular network segmentation | Service-level isolation enforcement |
| Security auditing | Strict audit and monitoring protocols | Comprehensive periodic audits |
| Reliability | Railway-operation-specific reliability | High-availability service maintenance |
| Attack protection | Industry-specific threat mitigation | Specific railway attack prevention |
| Data encryption | Mandatory strong encryption standards | End-to-end data encryption implementation |
| Updates & patches | Frequent security patch deployment | Timely critical update application |
Table 2 Security requirements of 5G-R network and railway 5G PNI-NPN
| Security Aspects | 5G‑R Network | Railway 5G PNI‑NPN |
|---|---|---|
| Privacy protection | Industry-tailored privacy protection | Customer data privacy enforcement |
| Network isolation | Granular network segmentation | Service-level isolation enforcement |
| Security auditing | Strict audit and monitoring protocols | Comprehensive periodic audits |
| Reliability | Railway-operation-specific reliability | High-availability service maintenance |
| Attack protection | Industry-specific threat mitigation | Specific railway attack prevention |
| Data encryption | Mandatory strong encryption standards | End-to-end data encryption implementation |
| Updates & patches | Frequent security patch deployment | Timely critical update application |
Figure 2 Railway 5G cybersecurity risk assessment flowchart
Figure 3 Analysis process of railway 5G network risks
Figure 4 Penetration testing flowchart for railway 5G networks
| Aspect | 5G‑R network | Railway 5G PNI‑NPN |
|---|---|---|
| Focus of evaluation | Internal network structure, terminal equipment vulnerabilities, and internal threat prevention | External boundary defence, external connection protection, and boundary security |
| Assets and devices | Critical railway communication equipment and internal network critical components | Railway-specific equipment and public network critical components |
| Security measures | Internal network isolation, access control, and internal encryption | Firewall, intrusion detection, and external encryption |
| Vulnerability identification | Internal vulnerability scanning, risk assessment, and internal penetration testing | External defence strategy assessment and simulated attack testing |
| Network interconnectivity | Internal communication security, private network isolation, and internal data transmission protection | External connection security, data transmission encryption, and external communication reinforcement |
| Threat focus | Internal threats and leakage risks, internal access control, and internal permissions management | External attacks and threat prevention; integrity protection of external communication data |
| Testing focus | Terminal equipment vulnerabilities, core network vulnerabilities, and access network weaknesses | Effectiveness of external defence strategy, network boundary stability, and external security vulnerabilities |
Table 3 Railway 5G network security assessment method differences
| Aspect | 5G‑R network | Railway 5G PNI‑NPN |
|---|---|---|
| Focus of evaluation | Internal network structure, terminal equipment vulnerabilities, and internal threat prevention | External boundary defence, external connection protection, and boundary security |
| Assets and devices | Critical railway communication equipment and internal network critical components | Railway-specific equipment and public network critical components |
| Security measures | Internal network isolation, access control, and internal encryption | Firewall, intrusion detection, and external encryption |
| Vulnerability identification | Internal vulnerability scanning, risk assessment, and internal penetration testing | External defence strategy assessment and simulated attack testing |
| Network interconnectivity | Internal communication security, private network isolation, and internal data transmission protection | External connection security, data transmission encryption, and external communication reinforcement |
| Threat focus | Internal threats and leakage risks, internal access control, and internal permissions management | External attacks and threat prevention; integrity protection of external communication data |
| Testing focus | Terminal equipment vulnerabilities, core network vulnerabilities, and access network weaknesses | Effectiveness of external defence strategy, network boundary stability, and external security vulnerabilities |
| [1] | ZHONG Z D, GUAN K, CHEN W, et al. Challenges and perspective of new generation of railway mobile communications [J]. ZTE technology journal, 2021, 27(4): 44–50. DOI: 10.12142/ZTETJ.202104009 |
| [2] | China National Railway Group. General technical requirements for railway 5G private mobile communication (5G-R) system (preliminary): TJ/DW 246-2022 [S]. China National Railway Group, 2022 |
| [3] | 3GPP. Security architecture and procedures for 5G system release 15 (V15.3.1): 3GPP TS 33.501 [S]. 3rd Generation Partnership Project, 2018 |
| [4] | GUO Y M, ZHANG Y. Study on core network security enhancement strategies in 5G private networks [C]//Proc. IEEE 21st International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT). IEEE, 2021: 887–891. DOI: 10.1109/icct52962.2021.9657934 |
| [5] | LI P Y, LIU J W. Security architecture and key technologies for super SIM-based 5G End-Cloud System [J]. ZTE technology journal, 2023, 27(1): 13–19. DOI:10.12142/ZTETJ.202301004 |
| [6] | SURESHSAH R T, BALASUBRAMANIAM M, DAS D. Novel 5G and B5G network architecture and protocol for multi SIM devices [C]//Proc. IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT). IEEE, 2021: 1–6. DOI: 10.1109/conecct52877.2021.9622360 |
| [7] | ZHANG X Q, HE Y M. Information security management based on risk assessment and analysis [C]//Proc. 7th International Conference on Information Science and Control Engineering (ICISCE). IEEE, 2020: 749–752. DOI: 10.1109/ICISCE50968.2020.00159 |
| [8] | ALIMZHANOVA Z, TLEUBERGEN A, ZHUNUSBAYEVA S, et al. Comparative analysis of risk assessment during an enterprise information security audit [C]//Proc. International Conference on Smart Information Systems and Technologies (SIST). IEEE, 2022: 1–6. DOI: 10.1109/SIST54437.2022.9945804 |
| [9] | WEI L, ZHA X, DAI F F. Network security interoperability towards cloud-network convergence [J]. ZTE technology journal, 2023, 27(1):7–12. DOI:10.12142/ZTETJ.202301003 |
| [10] | SZARVÁK A, PÓSER V. Review the progress of threat and risk assessment on 5G network [C]//Proc. IEEE 20th Jubilee World Symposium on Applied Machine Intelligence and Informatics (SAMI). IEEE, 2022: 353–358. DOI: 10.1109/SAMI54271.2022.9780829 |
| [11] | KANG H Y, XIAO Y H, YIN J. An intelligent detection method of personal privacy disclosure for social networks [J]. Security and communication networks, 2021: 5518220. DOI: 10.1155/2021/5518220 |
| [12] | PATEL K. A survey on vulnerability assessment & penetration testing for secure communication [C]//Proc. 3rd International Conference on Trends in Electronics and Informatics (ICOEI). IEEE, 2019: 320–325. DOI: 10.1109/icoei.2019.8862767 |
| [13] | XIE X Q, YU X G, YU Y X, et al. Penetration test framework and method of 5G cyber security [J]. Journal of information security research, 2021, 7(9): 795–801 |
| [14] | SARIKONDA M, SHANMUGASUNDARAM R. Validation of firmware security using fuzzing and penetration methodologies [C]//Proc. IEEE North Karnataka Subsection Flagship International Conference (NKCon). IEEE, 2022: 1–5. DOI: 10.1109/NKCon56289.2022.10126524 |
| [15] | SHARMA D, KHAN O, MANCHANDA N. Detection of ARP spoofing: a command line execution method [C]//Proc. International Conference on Computing for Sustainable Global Development (INDIACom). IEEE, 2014: 861–864. DOI: 10.1109/IndiaCom.2014.6828085 |
| [16] | YU X G, LI Y H, QIU Q. 5G security: a cybersecurity treasure trove for the age of digital intelligence (in Chinese) [M]. Beijing: Publishing House of Electronics Industry, 2023 |
| No related articles found! |
| 阅读次数 | ||||||
|
全文 |
|
|||||
|
摘要 |
|
|||||